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I. INTRODUCTION
The symbiotic relationship between evolved common law and the
market process has been noted for centuries.2  Having developed
from controversies that emerge in the conduct of day-to-day business
of ordinary human beings, the common law facilitated the enforce-
ment of contracts and the definition and enforcement of property
rights. Indeed, the complimentary relationship between the common
law and market efficiency has led some to supgest that the common
law is efficient in the allocation of resources. In contrast to statu-
tory law, which is formed more on the basis of political expediency
1. The authors are respectively, Assistant Dean, George Mason
University School of Law and Professor Emeritus of Economics,
Clemson University, and Senior Associate at PERC. Appreciation is
expressed for helpful comments provided by Elizabeth Brubaker,
Jonathan Adler, and Roger Meiners.
2. The Law Merchant, which for centuries provided commercial
dispute settlement across England and all of Europe, became embod-
ied in common law in the 17th century. For a discussion of the
17tcentury views of Sir Edward Coke on this topic, see Bruce
Yandle, Organic Constitutions and the Common Law, 2 CONST. POL.
ECON. 225, 234 n.7 (1991). See also Harold J. Berman, LAW AND
REVOLUTION 333-345 (1983) (providing a history of the Law Mer-
chant).
3. See Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J.
LEG. STUD. 51 (1977). Cf Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute
Law, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 205 (1982) (revising the original opinion).
See also Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic
Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 501 (2001).
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than on legal norms and principles, common law, where it has
evolved, was-and is-the law common to the people.4
In recent years, the relative merits of common law protection of
environmental property rights have become a topic of investigation
and debate within free market environmentalism circles.5 This, in
spite of the fact that federal statutes, having provided the foundation
for environmental regulation for more than 30 years, are seen gener-
ally as the most logical basis for protecting environmental rights.
Long before there were statutes that claimed to protect air and water
quality and other features of nature, the common law of nuisance and
trespass enabled holders of environmental rights, whether the state or
private citizens, to bring either a criminal or civil action when an-
other party invaded and damaged those rights without permission.
On the other hand, when a party wished to engage in actions that
might harm the environmental rights of another, the common law
allowed the two parties to engage in trade. By contracting around
common law rules, for example, downstream holders of common
law rights could transfer those rights to upstream holders or to other
parties and then accept the costs associated with the rights' transfer.
Decades before even the most creative economist thought of cap-
and-trade programs for managing environmental quality, the com-
mon law provided a framework for trading the right to pollute.
Yet while much has been accomplished describing how the com-
mon law worked to protect private rights to the environment, and
how the common law might work effectively again, little has been
done to show how the common law framework was used to maintain
and protect a community's environment. 6 There is only sparse dis-
cussion of public goods and bads. Put in terms of the law, most of
the discussion thus far has focused on private nuisance tort law. By
comparison, not much attention has been devoted to the tort or crime
of public nuisance. A better understanding of the law of public nui-
sance will contribute to a more fruitful debate about alternative insti-
tutions for providing environmental protection now emerging among
economists and legal scholars.
4. See F.A. Hayek, 1 LAw, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 124-127
(1973).
5. See Elizabeth Brubaker, The Common Law and the Environ-
ment, in WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT (Roger Meiners & Andrew
Morriss eds., 1998).
6. See id.
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In this article, we do three things. We first describe the economic
framework and vocabulary for analyzing public environmental
harms. This, of necessity, requires that we touch on the framework
for considering private harms. We also provide the vocabulary for
the common law of nuisance that parallels the economic framework.
This discussion contains the notions and theory of public bads and
their common law counterpart, public nuisance. The next part of the
article relates the discussion of nuisance law to a property rights
scheme that begins with common rights and ends with well-specified
rights. We follow this discussion with a series of case law vignettes
to illustrate how public nuisance law can work to deal with public
bads. The article concludes with brief final thoughts about ways to
strengthen the common law of public nuisance so that it can be used
more effectively to protect environmental rights.
II. THE WORLD OF BADS
According to Kenneth Boulding, "We produce 'bads' because
'bads' are jointly produced with goods. We want goodies, so we get
baddies." 7 Bads are actions or commodities that, at the margin, in-
crease cost or reduce utility for the recipient. Goods, of course, yield
benefits and positive marginal utility. Boulding was referring to the
classic 'Pigouvian' joint production problem where a factory, in the
course of producing steel products, spews soot and ashes on clothes
that are being dried in the sunshine by the laundry next door.8
Pigou's problem here was between two private parties - the owner
of the mill and the owner of the laundry. There were no other eco-
nomic agents involved. If, in this case, the soot is a bad, it is a pri-
vate bad that imposes an uncompensated cost on a well-defined pri-
vate party.
The mention of mills, soot, laundry and Pigou brings to mind the
taxation solution Pigou offered9 but later recanted. He proposed
placing a tax on the bads, so that the mill would take into account the
7. Bruce Yandle, Mixed Goods and Bads, 19 PUBLIC CHOICE 95
(1974).
8. Bruce Yandle, Coase, Pigou, and Environmental Rights, in
WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT, 121-133 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E.
Meiners eds., 1998).
9. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1932).
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cost being imposed on the laundry. Properly devised and imple-
mented, the 'Pigouvian tax' will "internalize the externality."'
0
Pigou was talking about external costs. Later, Pigou determined that
his solution was not a solution at all; this was before Coase l l and
then Buchanan and Stubblebine 12 theoretically leveled the Pigouvian
castle. 13 Instead of focusing on one-sided costs and benefits as ob-
served at the steel plant, the issue became simply how to reconcile
competition for scarce property rights when both potential users
would generate costs and benefits. And, as recognized by Coase's
extensive reference to case law, this formulation of the problem put
the matter squarely in the realm of the common law of nuisance and,
in some instances, trespass.
In a world of private bads, external costs that affect, and are con-
fined to, easily defined economic agents are seen as a private matter
by the common law. Economic theory sees the problem as a matter
that may be resolved by bargaining. Common law rules both specify
the party who holds the right to pollute or not be polluted, and pro-
vides a cause of action against the party imposing the cost. The
cause of action is more often than not based on the tort of nuisance.
At times, the law of trespass may also be used. Dating back almost
to time in memoriam, nuisance law is based on a 13th-century maxim
of law that developed in England: "Use your own property so as not
10. See generally id.
11. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. &
ECON. 1 (1960).
12. James M. Buchanan & William Craig Stubblebine, External-
ities, 29 ECONOMICA 371 (1962).
13. The debate between Pigou and Coase, with others such as Bu-
chanan and Stubblebine joining the fray, was about how to deal with
problems like pollution, sparks from chimneys and other unpleasant
aspects of life. In a deeper sense, the debate was about how to obtain
and maintain social order. The exchange that took place between the
two powerful intellectuals was important because it led to clearer
thinking and analysis about a broad category of social problems.
Although Pigou ultimately abandoned his position, which called for
command-and-control top-down regulation, he is still remembered
for having taken that position. Coase, on the other hand, called for a
decentralized approach, namely more effective enforcement of prop-
erty rights and contracts.
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to harm another's."' 4  According to legal scholar Elizabeth
Brubaker, the maxim entered the body of common law precedents in
1611 when it was stated in the now famous Aldred's Case, one of
the first cases at common law involving environmental pollution.'
5
Finally, in 1885, an English judge summarized the meaning of both
the maxim and private nuisance in the following way:
Prima facie no man has a right to use his own land in
such a way as to be a nuisance to his neighbour, and
whether the nuisance is effected by sending filth on to his
neighbor's land, or by putting poisonous matter on his
land and allowing it to escape on his neighbour's land, or
whether the nuisance is effected by poisoning the air
which his neighbour breathes, or the water which he
drinks, appears to me wholly immaterial. If a man
chooses to put filth on his own land he must take care not
to let it escape on his neighbour's land.
16
Over time, common law judges developed the concept of private
nuisance, which involves a wrongful interference with the use or
enjoyment of land. This doctrine was designed to prevent polluters
from harming "downstream" parties. Along with the definitions of
the law and the right holders came the notion of contracting around
the rule. At common law, market forces could deliver gains from the
trading of rights between downstream and upstream parties. Eco-
nomic theory explains how bargaining between parties can generate
a mutually beneficial way of contracting around the common law
rule and how the enforcement of property rights enables an ordinary
market to emerge. Private bads pose no particular problem in com-
mon law and economics.
A. Public Bads
Public bads are another matter. They are said to emerge when a
large number of parties are affected negatively and simultaneously,
at the margin, by an action undertaken by an individual or group.
The nature of the phenomenon is such that there is no low-cost way
to insulate and partition the affected individuals in the group from
14. Brubaker, supra note 5, at 89.
15. 9 Coke Report. fol. 59a (1611).
16. Brubaker, supra note 5 at 89 (quoting Lord Lindley's decision
in Ballard v. Tomlinson, 20 Ch.D. 115, 126 (1885)).
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the negative effect.' 7 What one group member receives, all receive.
To tighten the focus and at the same time illustrate the concept, a
pure public bad is said to exist if, for example, all homeowners in a
mining village receive equal amounts of corrosive emissions from
the local copper smelter. In this case, if the polluter responds and
the air is cleaned for one, it is cleaned for all. If one homeowner
took it upon herself to bring legal action against the smelter, hoping
to attract support to her cause from all the other homeowners, it is
likely that the lack of support would disappoint her. Benefits accrue
to one and all when the emissions fall, whether one pays or not., 8
Public bads can also be thought of in property rights terms; al-
though it is not entirely accurate to do so in economic theory, since
the theory relates to characteristics of the good, not the good's
owner. When public property, such as a navigable stream or state-
provided highway, is adversely affected by the action of an eco-
nomic agent, that action can be termed a public bad.
The economic analysis of public bads calls for a different theoreti-
cal approach than that required for private bads. Indeed, the eco-
nomic theory of public goods and bads inevitably includes such
things as collective decision-making, free-rider problems, govern-
ment coercion, and strategic behavior. Because of the level of deci-
sion-making costs, the world of public bads is not as neat as the
world of private bads. In the private world, the small numbers of
agents and clearly defined property rights enable bargaining to
emerge as a low-cost way to eliminate relevant private bads. The
problem is more costly to resolve in the world of public goods and
bads. As suggested in the discussion of the smelter and actions to
deal with it, one individual landowner along a publicly owned river
who is damaged by pollution that forms silt in the river may bring a
private suit against the discharger. However, it is costly for the same
individual to organize a large number of similarly situated silt recipi-
17. JAMES BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC
GOODs 49 (1967).
18. A public bad is impure when the dose received varies across
individuals or can be modified by some but not all individuals. Bu-
chanan, supra note 17, at 49-75. For example, those individuals
dwelling closer to the smelter may be more adversely affected than
more distant parties. The number of individuals affected, their cost
in organizing a suit, and the ability to contain the effect are the obvi-
ous differences between the private bad and the public bad.
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ents and then bring suit. The cost of organizing and the tendency for
individuals to free ride works against the individual's success. The
decision to bring suit obviously involves a benefit and cost calculus
on the part of an aggrieved party. When the benefits of a suit are
widely dispersed and the cost of bringing private action is concen-
trated, actions to protect public property logically call for a public
sector response. The sovereign has an obligation to protect the gen-
eral welfare, and the power to tax can deal with the free-rider prob-
lem.
B. Public Nuisance
At common law, a public nuisance is defined as an unreasonable
interference with rights held by the public in general, not merely
with the rights or interests of a few individuals. 19 An example would
be interference with the public's right to maintain the navigability of
a river. A public nuisance involves the harmful use of common and
public property.20 To make matters a bit more complex but useful to
us in later discussion, in cases that do involve interference with the
use and enjoyment of land, a private nuisance may co-exist along
with a public nuisance. This may happen when an individual has a
claim for damages that are different in kind from those suffered by
the general public as a result of the nuisance.
Under English law, the ancient public nuisance action was origi-
nally a common-law crime that involved the infringement of the
rights of the crown or the general public. 21 Today, a public nuisance
suit may be brought either by the state through its attorney general or
through another public official or public agency representing the
state or one of its political subdivisions, or by private plaintiffs.
When the case is brought by the state, the sovereign is essentially
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977).
20. Unlike a private nuisance, a public nuisance does not neces-
sarily involve interference with the use and enjoyment of land. In
Commonwealth v. S. Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 205 S.W.
581, 583 (Ky. 1918), the court said: "A common or public nuisance
is the doing of or the failure to do something that injuriously affects
the safety, health or morals of the public, or works some substantial
annoyance, inconvenience or injury to the public."
21. W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 86 (5 th ed. 1984).
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exercising its police power to protect the health, safety and/or morals
of its citizens. The appropriate remedy in this case is abatement via
injunction to either improve operations or to terminate operations.22
Private plaintiffs may bring a case seeking damages for harm suf-
fered as a result of a public nuisance if their injury differs in kind -
not simply in degree - from that of the general public. 23 They may
also seek injunctive relief. In public nuisance cases involving a pri-
vate plaintiff, the action is in tort. These cases are conceptually dif-
ferent from a public nuisance brought by the sovereign, which is
more analogous to an exertion of the police power of the state, as
noted above, rather than tort. Legal remedies available in public
nuisance cases include: an award of money damages; injunctive
relief to abate the nuisance; or a criminal proceeding if the case is
brought under a criminal nuisance statute. The plaintiff in a public
nuisance suit must prove that the defendant's conduct unreasonably
interfered with a public right. In suits brought by the sovereign,
22. Injunctive relief for nuisance was not available until the early
18th century, first awarded in English cases and later in the century
in American cases. Injunctions were authorized in cases of continu-
ing or recurring nuisance where damages were determined to be in-
adequate. See Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 89, 109 n. 101 (1998).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 C (1) (1979); see
also Burgess v. MV Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973); and
Koll-Irvine Ctr Prop. Owners Ass'n. v. County, 29 Cal. Rep.2d 664
(1994); Hanlin Group v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 759 F. Supp.
925 (D. Me. 1990) (holding under Maine law purchaser did not have
standing to maintain public nuisance action against vendor that had
allegedly contaminated land by releasing hazardous chemicals, ab-
sent any indication that purchaser suffered special injury.) In some
states, the requirement for the plaintiff to demonstrate a special in-
jury will not apply in cases seeking injunctive relief only, and not
monetary damages. As noted in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 821C, cmt. on subsection 2 (1979): "[s]tatutes allowing citizens'
actions or authorizing an individual to represent the public, and ex-
tensive general developments regarding class actions [suggest that
the requirement of an injury "different in nature" may be less perti-
nent in actions seeking abatement or injunction]." A small number
of states do not allow private citizens to bring public nuisance cases
against the state or against a municipality.
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liability for public nuisance is strict, however in private action on
public nuisances cases the liability is based upon the defendant's
negligence.
2 4
Common law actions for public nuisance will not be precluded
even though a polluter holds a government issued permit that allows
discharge, though in some cases state and federal environmental
statutes are interpreted to preclude public nuisance suits.26  How-
ever, an indication that a defendant is complying with permit re-
quirements will be considered, by most courts, as evidence of rea-
sonable conduct, a presumption that may be overcome. If a defen-
dant is in violation of permit requirements, this will typically be con-
sidered evidence of unreasonable conduct.
Rather than disappearing as vast state and federal regulatory re-
gimes were created to manage environmental quality in the 1970s,
public nuisance actions have continued to play an important role in
the area of environmental protection. Indeed, as one source has
noted, the action has, "if anything, [] gained in popularity in recent
decades, with heightened public concern over environmental is-
sues." 27 The rejuvenation of the old public nuisance action was fur-
ther promoted by passage of federal Superfund legislation, which
allowed for common law actions in conjunction with statutory
claims, and by the 1992 Supreme Court case of Lucas v. South Caro-
24. Halper, supra note 22, at 100. However, the liability issue in
public nuisance is confused: See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 821B cmt. e (1979) (Suggesting the defendant will be li-
able for public nuisance if his action was intentional, unintentional
but actionable under principles controlling liability for negligence or
reckless conduct, or was abnormally dangerous.)
25. City of Odessa v. Bell, 787 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. App. 1990).
26. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (Precludingfederal
common law nuisance actions, though not state common law ac-
tions); see also U.S. v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.NJ. 1981) affd,
688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding federal common law pre-
empted by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
and by the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA)).
27. P. WEINBERG & K.A. REILLY, UNDERSTANDING
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.01 (1998).
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lina Coastal Council,28 in which the court stated that if a landowner
lost all the value of his property to uncompensated regulation, and if
the action prohibited by the regulation was not a nuisance under
common law, then the landowner should be considered the victim of
a regulatory takings.
To illustrate the relative amount of court activity involving com-
mon law public nuisance actions, we conducted a Lexis search of
reported actions using the following terms: "public nuisance and
pollut! or environment! or health." We then examined each case in
the search results and deleted those that involved non-environmental
issues such as attacks on abortion clinics, gangs, gun manufacturers,
weed clearance, insurance claims, and lead paint. In short, we
sought to identify cases that related to what might generally consid-
ered environmental harms. The resulting count, by decade, is as fol-
lows:
State Court Federal Court Total
1960s 50 7 57
1970s 107 43 150
1980s 136 116 252
1990s 184 178 362
As indicated, public nuisance actions expanded with the rise of envi-
ronmentalism and federal legislation. This is especially noticed in
federal court activity where common law pleadings often accompa-
nied statute-based pleadings. Far from being a discredited body of
law for protecting environmental rights, public nuisance continues
apace.
Why might this be the case, given the extensive reach provided by
environmental statutes? Part of the answer to this question relates to
what public nuisance offers a plaintiff that cannot be provided by
statute-based remedies. While many statutes and even other tort ac-
tions have relatively short statutes of limitations, the equitable com-
mon law action of public nuisance has no statute of limitations.
Also, if a group of individuals is convinced that it has been damaged
by a polluter, a complaint to regulatory authorities may bring penal-
ties and other enforcement actions against the polluter. However,
there will be no payment of damages to the harmed individuals.
Statutes do not provide for damage payments. Violators of statutes
28. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992).
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are seen as having imposed cost on the sovereign, not on individuals.
We note that it is possible that a regulatory agency will declare an
emergency and provide emergency assistance to damaged private
parties. What about other remedies? Public nuisance actions can
bring court-enforced injunctions against polluters. They can be shut
down. Injunctions, which may be gained at common law, cannot be
obtained by citizens filing complaints under federal statutes. Only
the federal government itself can seek injunctive relief.29 As result
of this richness of common law remedies, actions involving Super-
fund sites often include common law pleadings along with those that
are statute based.3 °
C. Summary
The common law of public nuisance has evolved for dealing with
public bads. When an agent imposes a cost, similar in amount and
kind, on a group of individuals, then the harmed group can call upon
a public defender to bring a public nuisance action against the agent.
If a copper smelter discharges corrosive fumes that fall systemati-
cally on homeowners in the mining village, then any one of the
homeowners can call on the attorney general or prosecutor to bring
suit against the smelter. Alternately, if the emissions affect particu-
lar homeowners in demonstrably different ways, then those home-
owners may have a cause of action for either private or public nui-
sance, or perhaps both, against the offending business. Just as eco-
nomic theory ushers in collective decision-making and government
action when dealing with public bads, common law taps the shoulder
of the public attorney, who is paid with tax money. In both cases,
29. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032, 1049 (2d
Cir. 1985).
30. Indeed, it is in connection with CERCLA (Superfund) where
common law has resurged. Commenting on this, one author has
noted: "This shift [away from common law implied by the statute],
from the elegant and contextual common law approach to
CERCLA's ponderous and arguably arbitrary liability and cleanup
rules, may have encouraged state court judges to find the common
law applicable to hazardous waste cases in ways they previously had
not." Tom Kuhnle, The Rebirth of Common Law Actions for Ad-
dressing Hazardous Waste Contamination, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
187, 219 (1996).
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the free-rider problem is solved by the coercive tool of taxation. We
call attention here to the matter of incentives facing the prosecutor or
attorney general, especially when the defendant is the state, and the
degree to which the response is in fact a politically determined event.
We will address this concern later.
D. The Property Rights Framework
The economic theory of private and public bads and common law
treatment of private and public nuisance can be related to the notion
of property rights stations that describe different property defini-
tions. Figure 1 shows a property rights classification scheme that
begins with a commons and ends with private property rights.
Figure One: Property Rights Stations
THE COMMONS: There are no enforceable private, common or
public property rights. Economic analysis predicts dissipation of all
rents. Property rights analysis predicts a "tragedy of the commons."
COMMON PROPERTY: There are indivisible, nontransferable,
exclusive rights held in common by members of a family, tribe or
community. Economic analysis predicts efficient use, given the cost
of defining and enforcing private rights. Common law provides for
contract enforcement and for action against parties that impose cost
on the holders of common property rights. In Canada and the U.S.,
public nuisance is sometimes called common nuisance.
PUBLIC PROPERTY: There are indivisible, nontransferable, ex-
clusive rights held and managed by a political unit on behalf of citi-
zens. Some public goods, such as air and water quality may be con-
sidered to be public property. Economic analysis calls for collective
decision making. When public property rights are invaded, common
law calls for public nuisance action.
REGULATORY PROPERTY: There are limited, nontransferable,
indivisible exclusive rights assigned to individuals by regulatory
bodies. Economics applies theories of regulation, bureaucracy and
rent-seeking behavior to explain the allocation process. Regulatory
property lies outside the common law domain.
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PRIVATE PROPERTY: There are transferable, divisible, exclu-
sive rights held by individuals. Economics applies the standard the-
ory of consumer and firm behavior in predicting the use of the rights.
The common law of private nuisance is applied when an outside
party invades the rights or causes the rights to deteriorate.
A brief description of applicable economic reasoning and common
law treatment is provided for each of the stations. Common law
remedies are available for property rights protection in all but two
cases. The first is where no property rights are defined; hence there
can be no legal protection provided. The second is where property
rights are defined by statute law, as in the case of interstate matters
related to U.S. water quality, and common law rights are replaced by
regulatory property rights.
III. PUBLIC BADS AND PUBLIC NUISANCE APPLIED
Now we will illustrate how the law has worked by discussing a se-
ries of cases that involve claims of public nuisance. In each of these
cases the public nuisance claim is used as a mechanism for address-
ing an environmental harm: pollution to the land, water, or air. The
cases highlight the ways in which public nuisance has been, and still
is, used to protect environmental rights. Additionally, the cases il-
lustrate how public nuisance has adapted to rising concerns for in-
creased environmental protection.
31. For the relevant Court decisions that ended the period of fed-
eral common law protection of interstate waters, see Illinois v. Mil-
waukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); and Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304 (1981). For related discussion, see Roger E. Meiners, Stacie
Thomas & Bruce Yandle, Burning Rivers, Common Law, and Insti-
tutional Choice for Water Quality, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2000).
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A. The People of the State of California v. Gold Run Ditch and
Mining Co.32
This 1 9th-century case granted a perpetual injunction against a
California mining company after it was found that the company's
operations caused serious harm to the Sacramento and American
Rivers in California and to adjacent property. In terms of our prop-
erty rights taxonomy, the case illustrates protection of public prop-
erty-a navigable river, as opposed to a more highly stylized public
bads case. The case was brought on appeal from a judgment per-
petually restraining the discharge of mining debris into the American
River and compelling the discontinuance of those acts found to be
wrongful and injurious to the public's rights. Brought as a tradi-
tional public nuisance claim for equitable relief by means of injunc-
tion, the case did not involve a claim for damages.
The facts are as follows: Beginning in 1870, Gold Run, a Califor-
nia corporation, operated a hydraulic mine on 500 acres along the
north fork of the American River.33 The hydraulic mining process
involved piping large quantities of water onto a property and using
the force of gravity to propel the water over potentially gold-laden
dirt. The piped water would shoot with tremendous force from the
nozzle of a hydraulic monitor - a device much like a water cannon.
Monitors in the 1870s and 80s could be sixteen to eighteen feet long
and could blast water four hundred to five hundred feet. The moni-
tors would be used to break down the sides of riverbanks and moun-
tains. The rocks, dirt, and other debris that the water cannon broke
apart would then travel through gold-separating sluices. Gold would
settle behind riffle boards in these sluices but in the process, much of
the bank or mountainside that was being worked would be washed
into a stream or river. In this case, the resulting debris, or tailings,
flowed down a several hundred-foot drop into the non-navigable
American River, which joined the navigable Sacramento River,
32. The People of the State of California v. Gold Run Ditch and
Mining Co., 4 P. 1152 (Cal. 1884). See also Woodruff v. North
Bloomfield Gravel Min. Co., 45 F. 129 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1891) (issu-
ing a federal injunction that had the practical effect of virtually end-
ing hydraulic mining in the state of California).
33. People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152, 1153
(1884).
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where it "commingled with the tailings from other hydraulic
mines. ' 34
The trial court estimated that during its five-month long season of
operations, the company discharged between four and five thousand
cubic yards of material per day into the American River. This dis-
charge equaled a yearly discharge of "at least six hundred thousand
cubic yards. 35 The court noted that the bed of the American River
had been raised between 10 and 12 feet as a result of the dumping,
and the bed of the Sacramento River was raised between 6 and 12
feet. The rising riverbeds destroyed habitat and contributed to ex-
tensive flooding. During the flooding, mining refuse was deposited
on land adjoining the rivers, which the court believed could destroy
the land's economic value.
The Supreme Court of California implicitly recognized that this
case pitted two very powerful interests against each other: the min-
ing industry versus farmers. Yet the Court depicted the case as one
involving a rather simple question: did Gold Run - as the owner of
hydraulic mines located on the riverbank - have the right to dump
hydraulic debris into the waters of a non-navigable stream that emp-
tied into a navigable stream? If it did not have this right, then the
Court could determine whether or not Gold Run's actions constituted
a public nuisance. In other words, was the river protected by public
property rights?
The Court began its inquiry by noting that the Sacramento River -
into which the American River flowed - was a navigable river, and
that until 1862 deep-draught steam ships could travel anytime up-
river to the city of Sacramento. As of 1884 this was no longer the
case; farmers who lived upstream could no longer use river transport
to get their goods to market. The river was "a great public highway,
in which the people of the State have paramount and controlling
rights. 36 Because it was navigable in fact and in law and therefore,
was public property, the court could hold any unauthorized intrusion
upon it to be a nuisance. And because Gold Run's actions affected
not just the American River, but also the navigable Sacramento, the
issue of impeding a navigable waterway was an important one.
In its defense, Gold Run argued that it should not be held liable for
harms to which other mining companies contributed. The Court re-
34. Id. at 1154.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1155.
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jected this claim, noting that it was a valid defense in a case at law
for damages (where defendants would only be severally, not jointly,
liable), but was inapplicable in an equitable claim for injunction. 37
Gold Run further argued that it had acquired the right to discharge
its tailings from custom, by prescription, and by operation of the
statute of limitations. The Court likewise rejected these three claims.
While it was true, the Court said, that mining was customary in Cali-
fornia, this did not give Gold Run a legal right to interfere with a
valuable public resource. The Court's reasoning was as follows:
[A] legitimate private business, founded upon a local cus-
tom, may grow into a force to threaten the safety of the
people, and destruction to public and private rights; and
when it develops into that condition, the custom upon
which it is founded becomes unreasonable, because dan-
gerous to public and private rights, and cannot be invoked
to justify the continuance of the business in an unlawful
manner.
38
Citing an English authority, the Court said "The jus privatum ...
must not prejudice the jus publicum, wherewith public rivers and
arms of the sea are affected to public use."
39
The Court also rejected the remaining argument concerning pre-
scriptive rights and statute of limitations by saying that "a right to
continue a public nuisance cannot be acquired by prescription ...
Nor can it be legalized by lapse of time."4 Finding that all people of
the State had the right to use navigable rivers within the state, and
finding further that the state attorney general could maintain an equi-
table action in the name of the people, the Court upheld the judg-
ment for a perpetual injunction of Gold Run's activities.
37. Id. at 1157 (quoting Keyes v. Little York Gold Washing and
Water Co., 53 Cal. 724 (1874), "[t]his case clearly recognized the
equitable principle that, in an action to abate a public or private nui-
sance, all persons engaged in the commission of the wrongful acts
which constitute the nuisance may be enjoined, jointly or severally.
It is the nuisance itself, which, if destructive, of public or private
rights of property, may be enjoined").
38. Id. at 1158-59.
39. People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152, 1153
(1884) at 1159 (citing Lord Chief Justice Hale, DE JURE MARIS, 22
(1670)).
40. Id. at 1159.
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While the rhetoric of Gold Run suggests that it represents a battle
between public rights and rights of the mining industry, in fact it is
more accurate to read it as a battle of special-interest groups: miners
versus farmers. By 1884, after thirty-five years of intensive mining
in California, the miners were encountering serious opposition in the
battle for scarce resources. Protecting land rights - agricultural land
and otherwise - was clearly important to the Court and it did not
hesitate to impose significant costs on Gold Run, which was seen as
harming property and navigation rights. It is interesting that the
California Supreme Court did not engage in an overt balancing of
equities in this case. Rather, the Court relied upon a bright-line,
common law nuisance rule that prohibited unauthorized intrusions
on water highways that were public property.
When placed in a modern setting, the logic of the Gold Run deci-
sion indicates that common law courts could provide meaningful
protection for rivers, lakes, and other bodies of water that might re-
ceive costly discharge from private and public sources. Most sig-
nificant bodies of water in the various states are defined as public
property. At common law, deterioration of these waters could be a
cause of action undertaken by an attorney general or prosecutor.
Having stated this point, we now turn to face a serious difficulty.
Today in the United States, publicly owned treatment works, mili-
tary establishments, and federal energy facilities constitute the most
serious sources of pollution.4' After 30 years of intense regulation
and litigation, the uncontrolled discharge from industrial sources has
been more successfully eliminated. The pertinent question is this:
will state attorneys general and prosecutors be diligent in bringing
suit against their employers - cities, counties, and state govern-
ments? And what if the defendant is the federal government? The
same problem applies. Given the incentives at play, we suggest they
may not be diligent.42 Given a risk of disinterest in citizen com-plaints against government entities, it is important that alternate
41. BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT 76-77 (1997).
42. There is some evidence to support our suspicion. Kuhnle in-
dicates that in Superfund-related common law cases, where the
common law seems to offer distinct advantages over the statute for
obtaining remedies, "none of the nuisance cases brought in Califor-
nia... have been brought by a public official." Kuhnle, supra note
30, at 226.
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forms of action be made available. We will return to this issue in the
paper's last section and suggest ways that common law may be
strengthened to provide a partial path through this thicket.
B. Anderson et al. v. American Smelting & Refining Co.43
In our earlier discussion, we identified what might be called the
Achilles Heel of public nuisance. When a public nuisance is elimi-
nated or reduced, each member of a large group - the public - gains
simultaneously. No one, by definition, can be excluded from the
improvements. A potential free-rider problem emerges when any
single member of the group hopes that some other member or group
will assume the costs of pursuing the improvements, allowing the
free-rider to gain without paying at all or by paying a minimal
amount. The free-rider problem suggests the difficulties associated
with private actions on public nuisance. We shall now see how pri-
vate action dealt with a public nuisance problem.
Anderson involved two smelters and 61 holders of private property
rights that lived downwind from the plants that were located near
Salt Lake City, Utah. This 1919 air pollution case involves Mr.
Anderson and 60 other farmers who brought a common law suit
against American Smelting & Refining Company and United States
Smelting & Refining Company. The two smelters, with indistin-
guishable emissions, were located within three miles of each other.
The 61 farmers claimed their crops and livestock were damaged by
emissions of sulphur dioxide that became converted to sulphuric
acid, as well as by arsenic and other emissions. 44 Mr. Anderson and
his neighbors went to a local court and sought an injunction to stop
the smelters from polluting. The plaintiffs argued that "the
fumes... are offensive to the senses, and ... are injurious to the health
of the [complainants] and their families. That said fumes, gases, and
dust, either directly or by poisoning the grasses upon which they
feed, have caused and are causing many domestic animals ... to
sicken or die." 45 The smelter firms first responded by admitting the
emissions were present and practically unavoidable, but argued there
was no injury. They also argued there was simply no technical solu-
tion for the problem and pointed out the relative magnitudes of the
43. 265 F. 928 (D. Utah 1919).
44. Id. at 930.
45. Id.
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smelter operations as compared to the farmers. Technical evidence
presented at trial persuaded the judge to accept enough of the plain-
tiffs' claim of harm to sustain their position. The court focused on
common law rights and found for the farmers, but also noted the im-
portance of the industry. The court stated: "[T]here can be no solu-
tion [to the] smelter smoke problem.. .unless S02 is removed entirely
from the smoke stream ... or so diffused.. .the concentration.. .will be
reduced to a point imperceptible to the senses. ''46 On the other hand,
the court pointed out that no "industry, however important, can justly
claim the right to live or operate which creates a nuisance in opera-
tion or trespasses upon the property or the inherent personal rights of
others.
' 47
The court was caught on the horns of a dilemma. The common
law rule gave the farmers environmental rights, but there was no
known technical solution for this particular pollution problem.
Would the court close the smelter, or would the court find a com-
promise? Recognizing how costly it would be to close the smelter,
the court ordered the company to come forward with a solution or at
least an approach that would lead systematically to a solution. Fail-
ing that, the court promised to order the injunction remedy that
Anderson requested.
C. Board of Commissioners of Ohio County v. Elm Grove Mining
Co.
4 8
Twenty years later, a West Virginia court faced a similar dilemma.
The case involved a private company creating a public bad in the
form of air pollution. In the late 1930s, in the small West Virginia
town of Triadelphia, West Grove Mining Company operated a bitu-
minous coal plant. The plant began operations in 1915, many dec-
ades after the town was founded. 9 Over time, the plant became the
major employer in town and thus many depended upon it for their
livelihoods.
In a 1940 case before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vir-
ginia, a public authority (the Board of Commissioners) brought suit
46. Id. at 943.
47. Id.
48. Bd. of Comm'rs of Ohio County v. Elm Mining Co., 9 S.E.2d.
813 (W. Va. 1940).
49. Id. at 814.
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to enjoin the company from maintaining a public nuisance. The de-
fendant mining company had lost its plea at equity and was appeal-
ing that decision.
The facts of the case were as follows: as a part of the process of
mining bituminous coal, the defendant produced refuse that it dis-
posed of on its property. Elm Grove had produced this refuse from
the beginning of its operations. The result of this on-site trash dis-
posal was a "gob pile" approximately 200 feet wide and 1000 feet
long and from 30 to 60 feet high. In 1930, the pile caught fire and
burned and smoldered continuously up to the time of the suit. Elm
Grove attempted to extinguish the fire but was unsuccessful. From
1930 until 1933 - when a preliminary injunction was issued -the
company continued to dump combustible refuse on the burning pile.
Fumes from the continuously burning gob pile filled the air with
the smell of burning sulphur. Local residents complained of burning
eyes, throats, noses, respiratory-tract problems, headaches, coughing,
loss of appetite, and sleeplessness. Several physicians testified to the
ill effects the fumes had on the local community. Chemical engi-
neers determined that sulphur dioxide was the pollutant being emit-
ted into the air from the pile, although there was conflicting testi-
mony as to the concentration of the chemical in the air around Tria-
delphia. 5
0
Reviewing the record produced by the trial chancellor, the appeals
court found that dumping refuse outside a mine was a necessary part
of the mining process. However, they also found that the situation
"clearly warranted ... [a] finding that the fumes from the gob pile
constitute a nuisance affecting public health, within the meaning of
the [applicable] statute . . . on which this suit is grounded.",5 1 In
short, there was a public bad. The appeals court then had to consider
the injunction that had been issued against the coal company by the
lower court. The court noted that the West Virginia Coal Associa-
tion had filed an amicus brief, which stated: "To affirm the decree in
this instance is to decree from existence the mining of coal in this
State., 5
2
And so the battle lines were drawn: The claim of environmental
rights of a small community of some 300 people against a polluter
that was part of one of the major industries in the state. A public
50. Id. at 815-16.
51. Id. at 817.
52. Id.
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good, air quality, stood on one side of the court. Air pollution, a
public bad associated with the production of a private good, stood on
the other side.
To reach a decision, the court considered the balancing or com-
parative injury aspects of the case. The decision making process was
not as simple as determining who held the property rights. Given the
small number of people affected and the significance of Elm Grove
for Triadelphia, and the coal mining industry at large for the state of
West Virginia, one might expect that the scales tipped heavily in
favor of Elm Grove. Such expectations would be disappointed by
this decision.
The court stated that "[t]he 'comparative injury' doctrine should be
applied with great caution in nuisance cases, even those not involv-
ing public health . . . With all the more reason there is extremely
narrow basis undertaking to balance convenience where people's
health is involved., 53 The court stated further: "But public health
comes first. Even in as useful and important industry as the mining
of coal, an incidental consequence, such as here involved, cannot be
justified or permitted unqualifiedly, if the health of the public is im-
paired thereby." 54 The court was not convinced that enjoining Elm
Grove's activity would prove as disastrous as the coal mining trade
association argued and noted further that Elm Grove could dump its
refuse in another location away from the offending gob pile.
We note that in this case, as in the Gold Run case, the free-rider
problem was avoided, as the state used its police powers to protect
the health and safety of its citizens. No one citizen was forced to
bear the costs associated with addressing this public bad. Rather, the
public sector responded using the common law tool of public nui-
sance.
D. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co. 55
There are occasions where the common law serves to buttress stat-
ute law in providing protection from environmental harms. Even
though a polluter may hold a state-issued permit for engaging in en-
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Bd. of Comm'rs of Ohio County v. Elm Mining Co., 9 S.E.2d.
813 at 817 (W. Va. 1940).
55. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 303 A.2d 544 (Pa.
1973).
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vironmentally risky activity, if the polluter damages public property
or produces a public bad, common law remedies can still be applied.
We see an early example of this in a 1973 Pennsylvania water pollu-
tion case.
In 1915, a bituminous deep coalmine (Mine No. 15) was opened
for operations near the headwaters of the west branch of the Susque-
hanna River in Pennsylvania. The mine was operated by a series of
owners until 1939, when the defendant, Barnes & Tucker Co., took
control from a subsidiary, Barnes Coal Company. Barnes & Tucker
operated the mine until 1969, when it was closed and sealed. During
the 30 years when Mine No. 15 was open, Barnes & Tucker received
four discharge permits from the Pennsylvania Sanitary Water Board.
Permits were issued pursuant to the Clean Streams Law, which was
first enacted in 1937 and subsequently amended.56
In 1970, after Mine No. 15 was closed, it began to "inundate," and
in June and July of the same year, "substantial discharges of acid
mine drainage were discovered at two different locations., 57 The
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources filed a com-
plaint in equity seeking a preliminary and permanent mandatory in-
junction mandating that Barnes & Tucker treat the discharge. The
56. 35 Pa. Const. Ann. §691.1 et. seq. (2002).
57. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871, 873
(Pa. 1974). Mine No. 15 operated in an area with a number of other
mines. There were "cut throughs" between some of these mines.
Barriers--designed to prevent workers from sudden inundation of
water, but not designed to prevent any water seepage-were placed
at the connecting points of some of the mines; however, these barri-
ers had been breached and substantial amounts of water was flowing
from other mines into Mine No. 15. See Commonwealth v. Barnes
& Tucker Co., 353 A.2d 471, 476-77 (Pa. 1976) (hereinafter Barnes
I). On remand, the Commonwealth Court noted: "To maintain a
static level of water in Mine No. 15 thereby avoiding a breakout or
pressure or other discharge, it is necessary to pump from the mine
approximately 7.2 million gallons per day. Of this pumping figure,
approximately 1.2 million gallons per day are attributable to water
generated in Mine No. 5, while approximately 6 million gallons per
day are attributable to fugitive mine water generated in other mines
in the complex and findings its way into Mine No. 15." Common-
wealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 353 A.2d 471, 508 (hereinafter Bar-
nes II).
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Department subsequently amended its original complaint, basing its
claims on three counts of violations of the Clean Streams Law, and
one count of common law nuisance. 5 8 A preliminary injunction was
issued, requiring Barnes & Tucker to undertake treatment efforts
until a final determination was reached in the case. The trial court
found that a permanent injunction should not be issued because none
of the Commonwealth's theories for finding liability were valid.59
The Commonwealth appealed the decision.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that the case
presented important questions about the power of Department of
Environmental Resources to enjoin acid mine drainage from aban-
doned mines. The Court proceeded to analyze both the legal and
factual background of the case in conjunction with the history of the
Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law. This analysis led the Court to
dismiss the charges related to the Clean Streams Law. However,
unlike the trial court, the Court did find that the Commonwealth's
claims based on statutory and common law nuisance were applicable
and that injunctive relief could be granted based on these theories. 60
The Court held that Section 3 of the 1970 Clean Streams Law
made the discharge of sewage or industrial waste into Common-
wealth waters a public nuisance. This statutory provision was simply
a declaration of the common law at all times as it applied to Com-
monwealth waters. Addressing the common law public nuisance
issue, the Court attempted to clarify public nuisance principles in
Pennsylvania as they pertained to coal mines. The Court quoted a
1924 decision that it found pertinent:
'[T]he controversy . . .is controlled by one fact and a
single equitable principle - the fact that the stream has
been polluted, and the principle that this creates an en-
joinable nuisance if the public uses the water.' We find
this an accurate precis of public nuisance law and appo-
site to the present case. 6 1
The Court continued by stating: "We recognize that when the
Commonwealth brings an equity action to abate a public nuisance its
right to relief is not restricted by any balancing of equities, nor by
58. Barnes I, 319 A. 2d at 873.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 880.
61. Id. at 882 (citing Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co.,
126 A. 386, 387 (Pa. 1924)).
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any rule of demnum [sic] absque injuria.' 62 Recognizing that any
relief granted must, nonetheless, be reasonable, and recognizing fur-
ther that the Court did not have sufficient information to render an
appropriate decree, the Court remanded the case to the lower court to
make additional findings of fact.
On remand, the Commonwealth Court considered whether or not
the abatement methods presented to them in the record, in fact con-
stituted "an exercise of police power equivalent or amounting to a
taking of property without just compensation," and whether or not
the available abatement options were reasonable.63
The court suggested that the answer to these two questions could
not be readily determined from precedents in the state. In some
cases, the court noted, Commonwealth courts had allowed property
to be "taken" through use of police power even though this led to the
"entire suppression" of a business or imposed substantial costs on
the defendant. In other cases, courts had resorted to a rule of reason-
ableness. The court announced a rule that "a proper exercise of the
police power by legislative enactment does not, in itself, constitute a
taking of property for public use."64 But, if such legislation exists,
and if it does not completely outlaw a particular action, then the po-
lice power must be applied in a reasonable manner balancing public
and private needs and taking economic impact into consideration.
In this case, however, the court said it had no way to balance such
concerns because the defendant had failed to introduce evidence
concerning the economic impact that alternate abatement methods
would impose.65 The court refused, without additional evidence, to
find the abatement method being used to be either unreasonable or
unconstitutional. Thus, the court concluded that the discharge of
acid mine water from the Mine No. 15 constituted a public nuisance
which the defendant was responsible for abating. The company was
required to pump from Mine No. 15 enough water to avoid any fu-
ture breakout, and to maintain an appropriate water treatment pro-
gram to achieve water quality standards defined by law. Finally, the
court awarded money damages to the Commonwealth to cover costs
62. Barnes I, 319 at 886 (emphasis added).
63. Barnes II, 353 A.2d. 471, 478 (Pa. 1976).
64. Id. at 479.
65. Id. at 480.
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associated with operating and maintaining a dam used to hold back
mine water.
66
This case clearly demonstrates the vigor and the usefulness of
common law public nuisance as it relates to environmental harms.
In Barnes & Tucker we can see the limitations of statutes designed to
prevent and also to remedy environmental harms. The Clean Stream
Law of Pennsylvania, despite repeated and substantial modification
and amendment, did not provide protection against harms imposed
by actors working under a legally created permit regime. At the
same time, the statute did not limit the reach of common law reme-
dies. Barnes & Tucker suggests possibilities for augmenting federal
environmental statutory claims with common law public nuisance
claims so that courts may provide additional protection from public
and private bads. This case may also suggest that statutorily created
bars to the use of common law actions found in some federal envi-
ronment statutes should be removed.
E. Village of Wilsonville, et. al., v. SCA Services, Inc.67
The approach taken by common law courts when considering
whether to rule on the basis of some benefit and cost calculus, such
as balancing or comparing harm, or whether to simply rule on the
basis of property rights, varies across common law jurisdictions as
well as time.
All else being equal, communities with higher incomes tend to as-
sign greater value to environmental rights. Because of this income-
related preference for greater environmental protection, we can pre-
dict that public nuisance cases will increasingly be seen as important
vehicles for protecting environmental rights. Incomes vary across
states at a point in time and rise through time. A more recent public
nuisance case illustrates the point that over time, as incomes tend to
rise, citizens and their representatives demand greater environmental
protection.
In 1977, SCA Services began operating a chemical-waste landfill
in Wilsonville, Illinois. Approximately 90 acres of the company's
130-acre landfill was located within the city limits of Wilsonville,
66. Id. at481.
67. . Village of Wilsonville, et. al., v. SCA Services, Inc., 425
N.E.2d 824 (Ill. 1981).
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and the remaining acres were adjacent to the village. 68 SCA con-
tracted with generators of toxic chemical waste to remove waste,
which they hauled away and then dumped in a series of trenches on
their property. Most of the waste (95%) was placed in 55-gallon
steel drums before being placed in the trenches, 5% was placed in
double-wall paper bags. All the material was then covered with
clay. Further complicating matters, the landfill and village were both
located above an abandoned mine. The land above the mine showed
signs of subsiding and acid drainage from the mine was seeping into
the ground and into several surface drainage channels on SCA prop-
erty. The quality of the community's ground water supply was
threatened. A polluted aquifer for one family would be a polluted
aquifer for all. A public bad was in the offing.
In 1976, SCA received a permit to operate from the Illinois Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (IEPA). Between November, 1976
and June, 1977, 185 deliveries of toxic chemicals were made to
company property, including shipments of PCBs, asbestos, mercury,
pesticides and arsenic. After IEPA issued the permit, evidence ac-
crued that the ground upon which the landfill was built was more
permeable than previously thought.
In 1977, the attorney for the City of Wilsonville brought suit, al-
leging a public nuisance and seeking permanent injunctive relief. At
the trial and on appeal, the plaintiff prevailed on the basis that the
landfill was both a present and prospective nuisance. On appeal to
the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant argued the decision should
be reversed, that the landfill was not a prospective nuisance, that the
lower courts applied the wrong legal standard to find a prospective
nuisance, that the lower courts should have balanced equities in this
case, that the courts should have deferred to, or placed greater reli-
ance on, the decisions of the IEPA, the U.S. EPA and the Illinois
State Geological Survey permitting the landfill, that a mandatory
injunction should not have been issued, and that the injunction con-
stituted a taking of property without due process.69
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that the
landfill was a present and prospective nuisance, located on perme-
able soil that was likely to subside over time. The court found that at
least some of the steel drums were leaking when they arrived at the
68. Wilsonville v. SCA Serv., Inc., 425 N.E. 2d 824, 827 (Ill.
1981).
69. Id. at 830-31.
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landfill and that some had simply been pushed over the edge of the
trenches, rather than placed in by machinery. Given the toxic nature
of the chemicals, the court upheld the lower courts' decisions to en-
join further deliveries to the site.
The defendant next offered what might termed an efficiency argu-
ment. It argued that the lower courts failed to balance the equities
between the defendant's substantial investment in the business and
the economic value and utility of the landfill versus the harm to the
plaintiff. The supreme court rejected this line of argument, favoring
instead a property rights argument. The court cited a portion of the
trial opinion that read:
It is the opinion of the Court that.., nuisance cannot be
justified on ground of necessity, pecuniary interest, con-
venience or economic advantage. The Court understands
... that there is a need for disposal of industrial hazard-
ous wastes. However, where disposal of wastes creates a
nuisance said disposal site may be closed through legal
action ...The importance of an industry to the wealth
and prosperity of an area does not as a matter of law
give to it rights superior to the primary or natural rights
of citizens who live nearby.70
The court held that issuing an injunction for a prospective harm was
appropriate in the case because "it is highly probable that the instant
[chemical waste disposal] site will constitute a public nuisance if,
through either an explosive interaction, migration, subsidence, or the
'bathtub effect,' the highly toxic chemical wastes deposited at the
site escape and contaminate the air, water, or ground around the
site.'
The matter of permits issued by regulatory agencies was raised by
defendant, as was the question of whether the plaintiff should have
petitioned the regulatory agencies for relief before bringing suit.
This argument implied that the permits should shield the firm from
the courts' action. The court agreed with the lower courts that the
plaintiffs were not barred from bringing an action in equity. This
case was to enjoin a nuisance, not to review the issuance of the per-
mits, therefore, a court of equity was the proper venue for the ac-
70. Id. at 835 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 837.
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72tion. The court also noted that IEPA and U.S. EPA issued permits
based upon scientific evidence that proved to be inaccurate. Thus,
the lower courts were not required to defer to the decisions of IEPA
and U.S. EPA in permitting the landfill.73 The court rejected the
argument that the injunction constituted a taking of property without
due process. The defendant had argued that the decision of the
lower courts enjoining its activities and requiring exhumation and
reclamation constituted "sudden changes in State law." The court
found this argument without merit.
Finally, the court upheld the lower courts' rulings, issuing a per-
manent injunction against SCA, ordering SCA to exhume and move
the wastes deposited on the site and last, to reclaim the site. The
court summed up its position when it stated:
We are acutely aware that the service provided by the de-
fendant is a valuable and necessary one . . . But a site
such as defendant's, if it is to do the job it is intended to
do, must be located in a secure place, where it will pose
no threat to health or life, now or in the future.74
The importance of the Village of Wilsonville case is substantial. It
shows the vitality of public nuisance theories as applied to environ-
mental harms. Also, it specifically rejects the argument that admin-
istrative avenues are more appropriate vehicles for resolving disputes
about environmental harms, or related threats to public health. State
and federal permits provided no shield from liability for the prospec-
72. For cases that decide in favor of administrative review by a
pollution control board, see People v. New Penn Mines, Inc., 212
Cal. App. 2d 667 (1963) (precluding the Attorney General from
seeking to abate a public nuisance caused by toxic mine wastes
draining into a river because such authority vested with the state's
regional water pollution control boards); see also Schofield v. Mate-
rial Transit Inc., 206 A.2d 100 (Del. 1960).
73. The court also rejected the suggestion of the U.S. EPA that
was contained in an amicus brief filed with the appellate court to the
effect that some remedy other than permanent injunction and exhu-
mation of the waste should be crafted. The court noted, "It is ironic
that the host of horribles mentioned by the U.S. EPA in support of
keeping the site open includes some of the same hazards which the
plaintiffs have raised as reasons in favor of closing the site." SCA
Services, 425 N.E.2d at 839.
74. Id. at 838.
[VOL. XIV
PUBLIC BADS AND PUBLIC NUISANCE
tive polluters. Further, the decision shows the robust nature of equi-
table remedies available through public nuisance claims: permanent
injunction, exhumation and removal of the offending chemicals, and
reclamation of the property are thorough, and costly, methods of
addressing the prospective harms that SCA's activities were likely to
create.
F. State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp. 75
The ability of common law to interact with statute law is seen
again in a 1984 action brought by the State of New York against
Shore Realty Corp. and Donald Leo Grande, office and sole share-
holder of Shore, to clean up a hazardous waste site on Long Island.
Shore Realty had been incorporated by DeoGrande specifically for
the purpose of buying 3.2 acres of land on a small peninsula of land
on Long Island, which was surrounded on three sides by Hempstead
Harbor and Mott Cove. Mr. DeoGrande intended to develop the
76land and build condominiums.
At the time he purchased the property, DeoGrande and Shore knew
that hazardous waste was stored on the property and that cleanup
would be expensive. In its purchase agreement, Shore had the op-
tion of voiding the agreement with the seller if, after conducting an
environmental study, it decided not to proceed. Mr. DeoGrande and
Shore did proceed, despite strong cautions from Shore's environ-
mental consultant - which found the property in great disrepair and
found toxic materials leaching into groundwater and surrounding
waters of the cove and Hempstead Harbor. After receiving this re-
port, Shore requested a waiver of liability as a landowner for dis-
posal of hazardous waste stored at the site from the State Department
of Environmental Conservation. 77 The waiver was denied, but Shore
took title anyway in 1983.
Shore, and Mr. DeoGrande, took title to a mess, and the mess only
got worse. Sitting in the middle of the 3.2-acre site were five large
tanks holding "most of some 700,000 gallons of hazardous chemi-
cals" located on the property. Six smaller tanks, located above and
below ground, held additional hazardous materials. These tanks
75. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
76. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d
Cir. 1985).
77. Id. at 1039.
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were connected by deteriorating pipes to loading and dockage facili-
ties. Also on the property were warehouses holding over 400 cor-
roding and leaking 55-gallon drums of chemicals and contaminated
solid materials. 78  From October, 1983 to January, 1984, the prop-
erty's tenants, Applied Environmental Services, Inc. and Hazardous
Waste Disposal, Inc. added another 90,000 gallons of hazardous
chemicals to the leaking, corroded, poorly maintained tanks. None-
theless, Shore "essentially ignored the problem" until June, 1984,
when Shore employees asked the State to enter the site, inspect it,
and deal with what they claimed was a "life threatening crisis situa-
tion."79 Soon, DeoGrande and Shore found themselves in court be-
ing charged with cleanup liability under the federal Superfund stat-
ute.
At trial, the federal District Court upheld the State's motion for
partial summary judgment finding Shore and DeoGrande liable for
the State's response costs under Superfund and issued a permanent
injunction requiring the defendants to remove all 700,000 gallons of
hazardous material found on the site. This motion was stayed pend-
ing appeal. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted
that the case involved "novel" questions about the interplay between
the 1980 federal Superfund legislation and New York state public
nuisance law.8 °
The court found that Shore and DeoGrande were liable under the
federal statute for the state's response costs. The state incurred costs
from assessing the extent of environmental damage and supervising
the removal of drums of hazardous waste from the property; these
costs could be recovered. The court found Shore and DeoGrande to
be "covered persons" within the definition of the statute, meaning
that they were strictly liable for cleanup costs associated with re-
leases or threatened releases of hazardous material, so long as these
costs were consistent with the Superfund-created National Contin-
gency Plan.
Although the Court held Shore and DeoGrande liable for response
costs, it held the state did not have a right to injunctive relief under
the federal statute, finding that "Congress specifically declined to
78. Id at 1038. The hazardous materials included PCBs, benzene,
dichlorobenzene, ethyl benzene, and tetrachloroethylene.
79. Id. at 1038 n.3.
80. Id. at 1037.
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provide states with a right to injunctive relief."81 But here, the Court
recognized that state public nuisance law could be used to grant such
relief. Even though Shore and DeoGrande did not dump the hazard-
ous materials, as the owners of property, they could be found liable
based on their "exclusive control over the land and the things done
upon it and [thus they] should have the responsibility of taking rea-
sonable measures to remedy conditions on it that are a source of
harms to others."
82
The court found that Shore was strictly liable for maintaining a
public nuisance, noting: "[w]e have no doubt that the release or
threat of release of hazardous waste into the environment unreasona-
bly infringes upon a public right and thus is a public nuisance as a
matter of New York law."
8 3
The court held DeoGrande personally liable for costs of clean up
and removal by finding that he was an "operator" within the mean-
ing of the statute. Also, under New York law, corporate officers
who control the conduct of the corporation and are active partici-
pants in that conduct, are liable for the corporation's tortious acts.
The court stated that "[t]his general rule is particularly appropriate in
the public nuisance context, where 'everyone who.. . participates in
the ... maintenance ... of a nuisance are liable jointly and sever-
ally.' 84 The court did note that in supervising the injunction, the
trial court might need to reconsider DeoGrande's personal liability if
abatement expenses became prohibitive and disproportionate.
Shore presents an example of how public nuisance law can be used
to "fill the gap" in statutory law. Although Shore and DeoGrande
were held liable under Superfund legislation for response costs in-
curred by the New York Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion, the federal statute did not allow the state to seek injunctive re-
lief against the defendants - only U.S. E.P.A. could do that and
E.P.A. was not party to the suit. Injunctive relief is, however, an
important tool imposing costs on parties who assume liability. In
81. Id. at 1049.
82. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 at 1051 (2d
Cir. 1985). (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 839 cmt. d
(1979)).
83. See id.
84. Id. at 1052-53 (citing State v. Schenectady Chemicals, Inc.,
117 Misc. 2d 960, 966; 456 N.Y.S.2d 971, 976 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer
Co. 1983)).
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this case, clean up costs were shifted from the state to Shore, Deo-
Grande, and to the numerous other parties that Shore and DeoGrande
brought into the suit as third-party complainants. 85 The Shore case
shows how common law protection can interact with statute law in a
modem setting to impose costs on producers or owners of risky op-
erations. This, then, suggests possibilities for modifying statute law
to further invigorate common law protection of property rights.
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS
Our exploration of common law treatment of public bads has 1)
compared underlying legal theory with the economic theory of goods
and bads, 2) shown how this theoretical treatment can be viewed in a
property-rights context, 3) discussed key elements of public nuisance
case law, and 4) shown how common law treatment of public nui-
sance has worked within the context of statute law. While our dis-
cussion has revealed that public nuisance law can be robust in deal-
ing with environmental harms, our comments have also raised a flag
of caution.
State attorneys general and public prosecutors play important roles
in public nuisance cases by bringing action on behalf of citizens
and/or the state. And like all economic agents, these actors will be
guided by incentives. These incentives will be heavily influenced by
political pressure to protect government as well as politically strong
private firms from costly actions. At the same time, public attorneys
face resource constraints that limit the number of cases they are able
to litigate. Taken together, this may suggest that these attorneys liti-
gate too few public nuisance cases. At the beginning of our research
venture, we hoped to find that common-law protection of the public
could escape politics' heavy hand. Yet we did not believe this could
be entirely possible. As Elizabeth Brubaker has pointed out before
us, the definition of private rights is the only obvious way to escape
the vagaries of political enforcement of public property rights. 86 We
note that this has been the solution for the protection of water quality
in the trout streams of the United Kingdom and in parts of Canada,
85. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 648 F. Supp. 255
(E.D.N.Y. 1986).
86. See generally Brubaker, supra note 5.
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where angling associations own private rights in the fisheries. 87 In
those jurisdictions, the discharge of waste into public streams that
contain private property is disciplined by the common law of private
nuisance. But defining property rights, particularly rights to com-
mon property, is expensive - largely due to technological difficul-
ties. While the socially optimal solution for the effective resolution
of public-bads problems may be to carefully define property rights,
so that all such problems are converted to private bads thus obviating
the need for public nuisance actions altogether, this is unlikely to
happen anytime soon. In the meantime, it may be worthwhile con-
sidering options to strengthen the existing tort of public nuisance.
We believe there are certain institutional modifications that can be
made to invigorate common-law protection of public property and
the avoidance of public bads. We now offer two modest, but mean-
ingful, suggestions:
* The special-injury requirement for private action to be
taken in the context of a public-nuisance problem may
need to be revisited. Recognizing the important role that
the special-injury requirement plays, in terms of limiting
access to court to those cases where a plaintiff suffers an
injury-in-fact, we suggest further this option be consid-
ered as one possible way to alleviate the potential incen-
tive problems that public attorneys might face.
* All federal environmental statutes should include
language permitting the full range of common law ac-
tions, that is statutory barriers to common law actions
should be removed and common law actions should be
defined as having equal standing to administrative law
procedures.
87. Roger Bate, Protecting English and Welsh Rivers: The Role of
the Anglers' Conservation Association, in THE COMMON LAW AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 86 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morris eds.,
2000).
88. For a thoughtful discussion of potentially serious problems
created by an expansion of standing in the case of citizen-suits under
the major federal environmental statutes, see Jonathan H. Adler,
Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing and Environmental Pro-
tection, 12 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 39 (2001); and Maxwell L.
Steams, From Lujan to Laidlaw: A Preliminary Model of Enviorn-
mental Standing, 11 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 321 (2001).
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We conclude by again underlining our belief that common law
protection of property rights, both public and private property rights,
can be - and increasingly is - a vital component of market-driven
environmental protection. We encourage other scholars to join us in
our continued investigation of the common law alternative.
